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Two Ethics: Killing Animals in the Past and the Present  
 
Erica Fudge 
 
In Man and the Natural World Keith Thomas stated that “In 
the case of animals what was normally displayed in the 
early modern period was the cruelty of indifference. For 
most persons beasts were outside the terms of moral 
reference. ... It was a world in which much of what would 
later be regarded as ‘cruelty’ had not yet been defined 
as such.” As evidence Thomas cites the popularity of 
baiting, hunting, cock-fighting, hawking, the fairground 
contest of biting the heads off live chickens or 
sparrows, and bull-running. As well as these ‘sports’ 
Thomas lists as his evidence schoolboy games that 
included flaying live frogs, stoning dogs and throwing 
chickens into pike-infested ponds.
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 What emerges from just 
these few pages of a lengthy book is a vision of a world 
of savagery and, as he notes, grotesque indifference to 
animal suffering.  
 In this essay I will argue, however, that to state 
as Thomas does that animals were “outside the terms of 
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moral reference” is to fail to fully examine the nature 
of the ethical context of the early modern period, and, 
as such, is to write off those events listed as evidence 
of a lack of a concept of cruelty to animals as mere 
barbarity rather than as important indicators of a 
complex attitude to animals. And, it is worth noting, a 
claim for the savagery of the period, which is implied in 
Thomas’ statement, would also remove those elements of 
early modern culture that we do not regard as savage--
Shakespeare’s plays, the poetry of John Donne, and so on-
-from one aspect of their historical context. In this 
essay I will argue that in early modern England the 
ethical context of human relationships with animals--and 
in particular, the killing of animals--was much more 
complex that Thomas allows for. I will also argue that 
recognizing this complexity might allow us to re-evaluate 
not only the early modern period, but also modern 
human/animal relations. I begin with what is the central 
mode of ethics in the period, I will then shift my focus, 
as numerous early modern thinkers did, to trace another 
ethic that undercuts Thomas’ assertion and offers another 
way of thinking about the past. 
 
Self-Serving Kindnesses 
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Philip P. Hallie proposes a useful title for what is the 
most orthodox ethical framework in the early modern 
period: “Inward Government” theory. This theory--emerging 
from the classical as well as the Christian tradition--
proposes that “a good person is one whose passions are 
under control of his reason. To be good one’s soul must 
be a harmonious, smoothly running state with reason at 
its head. To be good is to be self-controlled, or rather 
reason-controlled.”2 Such a theory was based upon a belief 
in a struggle between the body and the soul, the flesh 
and the spirit in every human, and it was the passions--
the appetites of the body rather than the mind--that must 
be controlled. These passions, in the words of Nicholas 
Coeffeteau, “reside onely in the sensitive appetite, and 
... they are not fashioned but in the irrationall part of 
the soule.”3 To live through direction only of one’s 
passions (which include such things as love, hatred, 
desire, pleasure and fear) without using one’s mind was, 
in this theory, to descend to the level of the beast, and 
this descent was literal, not merely metaphorical. The 
key division in “Inward Government” theory was between 
human and animal and was based upon an analogous binary: 
the possession or lack of reason. Animals, so the 
tradition argues, lack reason, and therefore lack self-
awareness and self-control. Humans possess reason, and 
should therefore exercise it in self-awareness and self-
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control. It is the role--perhaps a better word would be 
duty--of the human to ensure that they are self-
controlled; that they govern their urges and live 
reasonably. 
 Within this theoretical framework, animals are the 
absolute other; despite the prospect of the human 
becoming a beast, animals are perceived to have no 
community with humans. They are the things against which 
humans position themselves (there is, as I discuss later, 
a difference between being a human being beastly and 
being an animal). But the theory uses this opposition of 
human and animal to reiterate the centrality of not 
merely humanity, but the individual human; the self. The 
focus is not upon the community as a whole--the 
government of others--as much as it is about the 
government of one’s own being (although the former can 
emerge out of the latter--a tyrant rules through passion 
rather than reason).
4
 In discussions of cruelty, for 
example, writers do not deal with the moral patient--the 
individual suffering--but instead focus on the moral 
agent--the individual being cruel--and as such self-
control, not suffering, is key. This is something that 
can be traced in a text that had a massive influence on 
Renaissance thinking: Seneca’s De Clementia.5  
Seneca’s work was translated into English by Thomas 
Lodge in 1614 as A Discourse of Clemencie. In it Seneca 
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writes: “Crueltie is humane evill, it is unworthy so 
milde a minde: this is a beast-like rage to rejoice in 
bloud and wounds, and laying by the habite of a man, to 
translate himselfe to a wilde beast.”6 No mention is made 
here of the individual suffering the infliction of 
cruelty: the effect of cruelty is discussed only in 
relation to its impact upon the moral agent, the person 
being cruel. The cruel man becomes, for Seneca, a “wilde 
beast”; this is not mere exaggeration or imagery, but the 
transformation is logical: because he has ceased to use 
his reason, has become unreasonable, the distinction 
between human and animal that underpins Seneca’s (and so 
many others’) work has broken down, and the cruel self 
therefore is--logically--translated into the beast. 
 Such an “egocentric theory” (Hallie’s phrase) is 
central to numerous writings in early modern England, and 
it finds a clear illustration in texts that look at the 
human relationship with animals. Many of these take as 
their source not only classical ideas but also the work 
of the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas Aquinas, in 
which classical and Christian thought were brought 
together. Aquinas took from Plato and Aristotle a belief 
that within God’s creation there is a chain of being 
which organizes that world. Arthur O. Lovejoy, quoting 
from Aristotle, has defined such a “conception of the 
universe” as one in which there was  
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an immense, or ... an infinite, number of links 
ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest 
kind of existents, which barely escape non-
existence, through `every possible’ grade up to the 
ens perfectissimum--or, in a somewhat more orthodox 
version, to the highest possible kind of creature, 
between which and the Absolute Being the disparity 
was assumed to be infinite--every one of them 
differing from that immediately above and that 
immediately below it by the ‘least possible’ degree 
of difference.
7
 
 
Human superiority to animal is, as in “Inward Government” 
theory, based on possession of reason, while animal 
superiority to plant is based on the capacities for 
movement and perception (these are the degrees of 
difference). Both of these forms of superiority are 
presented as natural, and are evidenced in use: Aquinas 
states “It is, therefore, legitimate for animals to kill 
plants and for men to kill animals for their respective 
benefit.” In fact, that legitimacy is regarded as a 
natural duty: as Dorothy Yamamoto succinctly presents it, 
for humans in Aquinas’ theory “there is no sin in killing 
animals. In fact, to refuse to eat meat is to spurn the 
careful provisions which God has made to sustain human 
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life on earth.”8 But this is not the end of the uses of 
animals given to humans on the basis of their 
superiority, and in a passage only a couple of pages 
after the above quotation from Aquinas, it seems that so 
superior is the human, the distinction between animal and 
plant appears to disappear. Aquinas writes: “He who kills 
another’s ox does indeed commit a sin, only it is not the 
killing of the ox but the inflicting of proprietary loss 
on another that is the sin. Such an action is, therefore, 
included not under the sin of homicide but under that of 
theft or robbery.”9 Killing an ox, it would seem, is 
little different from, say, stealing a cart.  
However, even as he appears to present animals as 
mere objects, there is, in Aquinas’ theory, the 
possibility of kindness, but this kindness, once again, 
does not represent a vision in which animals are humans’ 
moral equals, far from it. Animals, Aquinas writes, can 
be “loved from charity as good things we wish others to 
have, in that by charity we cherish this for God’s honour 
and man’s service.”10 That is, animals should be cared 
for, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of their 
owners, or of God. This perception of animals is taken up 
in England in the early modern period, and a summary is 
offered that is clear, to the point, and wholly in 
keeping with “Inward Government” theory: in his 1612 
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sermon Mercy to a Beast John Rawlinson wrote “Save a 
beast’s life and save a mans.”11  
Taking, like Rawlinson, their lead from Aquinas and 
from Proverbs 12:10--“a righteous man regardeth the life 
of his beast”--numerous other early modern theologians 
were led into discussions of the moral responsibility of 
humans towards animals, but their discussions remain 
strangely--although logically--egocentric, self-
interested. Writing in 1589 Thomas Wilcox stated: “hee is 
mercifull, if to beastes, much more to men.”12 Likewise in 
1592 Peter Muffett wrote, “if he be so pitifull to his 
beast, much more is he mercifull to his servants, his 
children, and his wife.”13 Here, we have a glimpse of the 
natural world in microcosm, of a domestic chain of being: 
animals are at the bottom, with the master/father/husband 
at the top. However, even in this inferior position 
animals are still perceived to be within the moral 
compass of humanity, but for a particular reason: 
becoming inured to viciousness to animals, so the Thomist 
argument goes, makes one more likely to be vicious to 
humans, something that would endanger not only other 
humans (a concern, but not the most important one here) 
but also one’s own immortal soul (the greatest concern of 
all).  
Keith Thomas has labeled this early modern 
perception of animals as beings within the moral compass 
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of humanity as a “new attitude,” and argues that it is 
paradoxical that such a vision should come from “the old 
anthropocentric tradition.”14 What he fails to take full 
notice of is that, not only do the “new” ideas merely 
repeat what can be found in the much older Thomist model, 
but that they remain absolute in their anthropocentrism. 
Kindness to animals is asserted, not because animals 
deserve to be treated with kindness, but because it is 
self-serving: as Joseph Hall wrote, “The mercifull man 
rewardeth his owne soule; for Hee that followeth 
righteousnesse and mercy, shall find righteousnesse, and 
life, and glory; and therefore, is blessed for ever.”15  
But, there is something that can be labeled as “new” 
in early modern English ethics, something that Thomas 
doesn’t fully take notice of. In fact, he seems, 
initially, to dismiss out of hand the importance of the 
work of those thinkers--Montaigne and his followers--who 
can be traced as a source of this new ethic in England in 
the early seventeenth century: “most contemporary 
readers”, Thomas writes, “would have thought them 
extravagant nonsense.”16 This dismissal of the influence 
of ideas voiced by Montaigne comes in part, I think, 
because Thomas regards what he terms the “new 
sensibility”--what might actually be called the ‘generous 
anthropocentrism’ of Thomism--as a positive enough 
response. But the other proposal about animals that gets 
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such short shrift from Thomas comes from another way of 
looking at the world. This is not a focus upon inward 
government, rather the gaze is outside of the self, and 
onto the other, and that other, it turns out, can be an 
animal. 
 
The Community of the Self 
 
Montaigne’s essay “Of Cruelty” was first published in 
1580 and expanded as Montaigne returned to his essays 
between 1580 and 1588. It is, so Hallie argues, “one of 
the most powerful essays on ethics ever written. ... In a 
few pages it manages to explore and explode one of the 
main traditions in the history of man’s thought about 
good and evil, and then--again with remarkable brevity--
it makes a statement about ethics that illuminates and 
gives vitality to the usually heartless abstractions of 
Western ethics.”17 What Montaigne does that is so 
remarkable at that date is turn away from the self that 
is central to inward government theory and look instead 
at the other, at the individual on whom cruelty is 
inflicted. But as if this turn in itself was not 
noteworthy enough Montaigne goes further, and makes the 
crucial distinction in his worldview not reason but 
sentience; not the ability to rationalize the world but 
the capacity to feel in it. He argues “Savages do not 
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shock me as much by roasting and eating the bodies of the 
dead as do those who torment them and persecute them 
living.”18 The reason for this statement is clear: at 
least the bodies that are cannibalized are already dead, 
while those that are tortured still live, and are 
therefore able to feel. He cannot even look, he writes, 
“on the executions of the law, however reasonable they 
may be ... with a steady gaze.” Punishment should be, 
instead, upon the bodies of dead criminals not live ones, 
“against the shell, not the living core.”19 
This emphasis on sentience rather than reason, on 
the capacity to feel rather than the capacity to 
rationalize, inevitably leads Montaigne to a discussion 
of animals. “I have not even been able without distress 
to see,” he writes, “pursued and killed an innocent 
animal which is defenseless and which does us no harm.” 
His distress is not sentimental, however--that is, it is 
not emotional or anthropomorphic--it is based on this new 
logic. He writes of animals: “There is some relationship 
between them and us, and some mutual obligation.”20 The 
fact of the relationship leads, for him, logically to a 
sense of obligation; animals, unlike the dead bodies of 
humans, are sentient, and can, if only by basic means, 
communicate their suffering. There is, on this basis, 
recognition, and from that recognition should come 
society, fellow-feeling. Montaigne writes that when, in 
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the hunt, “the stag, feeling himself out of breath and 
strength, having no other remedy left, throws itself back 
and surrenders to ourselves who are pursuing him, asking 
for our mercy by his tears ... that has always seemed to 
me a very unpleasant spectacle.”21 The spectacle is 
unpleasant because the stag can communicate its 
suffering, or rather, because Montaigne is willing to 
believe that what is being communicated in the tears in 
the eyes of the stag can--and must--be interpreted as 
suffering. Where in inward government theory the focus 
was on the beast within--the unreasonable part of that 
reasonable creature, the human--for Montaigne, the focus 
is upon the creature outside of us.
22
 
 While in Montaigne’s work there is a turning away 
from assertions of human superiority and the significance 
of the rule of reason that is rare in this period, his 
inclusion of animals within the human moral framework can 
be found in other writers. Strangely, in relation to his 
earlier dismissal of the influence of Montaigne on 
English ethical thinking, Thomas seems to change his mind 
when he notes not only that Montaigne’s Essais were 
translated into English twice during the seventeenth 
century, but also that “Many shared the view expressed by 
Montaigne” in “Of cruelty.”23 Thomas’ ambivalence towards 
the power and influence of Montaigne’s attitude to 
animals is not unusual. Numerous critics of Montaigne 
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have also refused to take his views in and of themselves 
wholly seriously. In his study of the ethical and 
political themes in Montaigne’s Essais, for example, 
David Quint writes: “The essayist will advocate kindness 
toward animals less because of sentimental notions of 
creaturely kinship, than because ‘humanity’ separates us 
from the cruelty of an animal world of predators and 
victims--which the hunt too closely resembled. Our 
capacity for humanity counters our bestial instinct to 
inhumanity.”24 Quint here seems to be reading Montaigne as 
an inward government theorist, and is ignoring the fact 
that in the longest of his Essais, “Apology for Raymond 
Sebond,” Montaigne writes, “We recognize easily enough, 
in most of their works, how much superiority the animals 
have over us, and how feeble is our skill to imitate 
them.”25 Such a statement as this (and there are numerous 
other similar ones) goes against the interpretation of 
animals as images of predation and violence that Quint 
proposes. And, because he ignores this aspect of 
Montaigne’s work, Quint has nothing further to say about 
Montaigne’s attitude towards animals.  
 Another refusal to take Montaigne’s vision of 
animals wholly seriously can also be traced in The Happy 
Beast in French Thought of the Seventeenth Century, 
George Boas’ study of Montaigne and his followers. Boas 
regards Montaigne’s “theriophily” (love of animals) as an 
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exercise within the popular “genre of the Paradoxes,” in 
which writing was “for literary effect and not for 
demonstrating truth.”26 Animals are, it would seem, merely 
part of a literary game that Montaigne is playing, they 
are never real animals. It is as if, so often, critics 
are unwilling to contemplate the possibility that a key 
thinker of the early modern period might have something 
radical (still radical) to say about nonhuman beings. It 
is as if it is not quite possible to reconcile the 
centrality of Montaigne with the perceived marginality of 
thinking about animals. This is not a view that was 
shared in Montaigne’s own time. Sir William Cornwallis, 
for example, wrote in 1610 of Montaigne’s “womanish” 
discussion of the “death of birdes and beasts”; “alas 
this gentlenesse of Nature is a plaine weakenesse.”27 
There is nothing to suggest in this dismissal that 
Cornwallis didn’t take Montaigne at his word, that he 
didn’t read Montaigne’s views about animals as serious. 
It’s just that he didn’t agree with them.  
 However, I also want to argue that Montaigne’s views 
about animals are worth taking seriously, and that to 
dismiss them is to undermine the coherence of his wider 
ethical statements. As well as this I want, as a 
historian, to take Montaigne’s views seriously because 
there is evidence that his ideas were taken up by a 
number of writers in England, and that while it is 
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difficult to attribute them at origin directly to 
Montaigne, these writers do reiterate arguments that are 
present in the Essais. What perhaps links Montaigne to 
these English writers is not nationality or religion--the 
works that follow are by English Protestants while 
Montaigne was a French Catholic--but the sense in which 
it is the everyday rather than the abstract that is the 
focus. Where Seneca detailed cruelty as an abstract 
concept, Montaigne wrote not only about the concept, but 
about actual events, often events that he was directly 
involved with. Likewise, the English writers I will look 
at are writing manuals to direct everyday living, are 
giving sermons to address ordinary concerns. They come 
from a background in theology, certainly, but for them 
the Bible is the source of ethics, and ethics, for Joseph 
Hall, one of the most renowned sermonizers of the age, is 
“a Doctrine of wisedom and knowledge to live wel. ... the 
end wherof is to see and attaine that chiefe goodness of 
the children of men”.28 We are dealing with what might be 
termed good lives, not just with the inward government 
theory’s focus on good selves. Although the two--good 
lives and good selves--are inseparable, in Montaigne’s 
new ethics a good life must take note of the world in 
which it is lived, it must include in its contemplation 
not only its own actions, but also the impact of those 
actions on other beings in that world. This is very 
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different from attempting to attain a good self. But, as 
well as emphasizing the importance of Montaigne’s 
attitude to animals, it is also possible to see how 
another context made the notion of the community of all 
creatures more acceptable than might be expected in early 
modern England. 
 
The Other Ethics 
 
During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
natural philosophy, the study of the natural world, was a 
very different practice from modern zoological or 
ethological investigations. On one level the natural 
world was studied, not because it was of interest in 
itself, but because it offered a further understanding of 
the creator. In his Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes, for 
example, Edward Topsell, a cleric, proposed that animals 
were created in order “that a man might gaine out of them 
much devine knowledge, such as is imprinted in them by 
nature, as a tipe or spark of that great wisedome whereby 
things were created.”29 What follows in this lengthy text 
is an attempt to outline the workings of God through an 
analysis of animals, and the implication of that 
intention was, as Peter Harrison has written, that “the 
literary context of the living creature was more 
important than its physical environment. Animals had a 
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‘story’, they were allocated meanings, they were emblems 
of important moral and theological truths.” As well as 
this, another early modern conception added to the 
meaning of the natural world. This conception emphasized 
animals’ connection with humans: as Harrison notes, the 
human was perceived as “an epitome of all the animals. 
Birds and beasts could thus symbolise distinct passions, 
virtues and vices.”30 The cunning of a fox, the loyalty of 
a dog, the timidity of a hare, all of these apparently 
pre-determined animal behaviors were used to explain more 
generally the concepts of cunning, loyalty and timidity 
in humans. 
In these terms, animals were represented as 
meaningful and recognizable to humans. To offer just one 
example, Topsell begins his chapter “Of the Elephant” 
with the following statement: “There is no creature among 
al the Beasts of the world which hath so great and ample 
demonstration of the power and wisedome of almighty God 
as the Elephant: both for proportion of body and 
disposition of spirit.” The spirit of this animal 
includes, in Topsell’s analysis, its generosity: “They 
are so loving to their fellowes, that they will not eat 
their meat alone, but having found a prey, they go and 
invite the residue to their feastes and cheere, more like 
to reasonable civill men, then unreasonable brute 
beasts.”31 Here, a mere animal is presented as being 
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capable of the “civill” behavior that humans so 
frequently fail to display. As such, the elephant offers 
to Topsell’s readers a vision of how a good human might 
behave. God has sent this sign, and the natural 
philosopher’s argument is that humans should learn to 
interpret it correctly, and from that interpretation 
become better--more Godly--people.  
The outcome of this understanding of the study of 
animals is, then, that animals are often 
anthropomorphized. The male bear, to offer another 
example, has the decency to leave the female bear alone 
when she is pregnant, and the clear meaning of this 
zoological ‘fact’ is that male humans should act in the 
same way towards pregnant women.
32
 What this 
anthropomorphism does is reduce the distance between 
humans and animals. Animals remain lesser beings--their 
virtuous behavior is not willed, it comes from natural 
instinct rather than a process of moral decision making, 
also known as reason--but the naturalness of an animal’s 
virtue reinforces the need for humans themselves to be 
virtuous. “For yf,” as the translation of one French text 
of 1585 presented this argument, “the beastes do better 
their office accordyng to their nature, then men doe 
theirs, they deserve more to be called reasonable, then 
men.”33   
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 This sense in natural philosophy of the closeness of 
humans and animals feeds into other discourses and 
offers, I suggest, a context into which Montaigne’s 
assertion of the human community with animals may have 
comfortably fit. When tracing Montaignean ideas in 
England, then, we are tracing not only the emergence of a 
new ethic, but also recognition that this new ethic was 
not absolutely at odds with pre-existing ideas in a 
different discourse. What both have in common is the 
assertion that it is through animals that humans can live 
good, ethical lives. 
Robert Cleaver’s A Plaine and Familiar Exposition of 
the Eleventh and Twelfth Chapters of the Proverbes of 
Salomon (1608) begins to show how a shift in focus from 
the good self to the good life might manifest itself in 
ethical discussion. Looking at Proverbs 12.10 once again, 
Cleaver writes:  
 
Mercy is to be shewed not onely to men, but to the 
unreasonable creatures also. As all creatures doe 
taste of, and live by the aboundant liberality and 
bountifulness of Gods hand, so would he have them to 
feele by sense, though they cannot discerne it by 
reason, that there is also care for them and 
compassion in his children.
34
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Here animals’ lack of reason is regarded as a lack (in 
this Cleaver is very different from Montaigne) but that 
lack is not all that is regarded. Instead, and more like 
Montaigne, Cleaver asserts animals’ ability to feel as 
the more important ethical point. It is for this reason 
that humans are to show mercy to them. By acknowledging 
the sentient nature of animals--their God-given capacity 
to feel in the world--Cleaver shifts his ethics to allow 
for this fact. Reason is not all that is worth 
recognizing. 
 A different aspect of Montaigne’s thought can be 
traced in Joseph Hall’s 1625 discussion of Balaam and his 
ass (Numbers 22.21-33). Hall begins with the miracle of 
the speaking ass “whose common sense is advanced above 
the reason of his rider,” and argues that this is an 
example of the power of the Almighty: “There is no mouth, 
into which God cannot put words: and how oft doth hee 
choose the weake, and unwise, to confound the learned, 
and mighty.” This theological discussion, however, leads 
to something very different. The theory, in fact, leads, 
as it often does in Montaigne’s work, to something much 
more practical. Hall writes: 
 
I heare the Angell of God taking notice of the 
cruelty of Balaam to his beast: His first words to 
the unmercifull prophet, are in expostulating of 
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this wrong. We little thinke it; but God shall call 
us to an account for the unkind and cruell usages 
of his poore mute creatures: He hath made us Lords, 
not tyrants; owners, not tormenters.
35
 
 
Nothing, it seems, could be more different from the 
Thomist perspective. Here, cruelty to animals is 
something that is not a path to sin (Aquinas’ view) but 
is sinful in and of itself. Animals, not the owners of 
the animals in this interpretation can be worthy 
recipients of kind acts by moral agents. In this Hall has 
moved the boundaries of community; has included animals 
within his moral framework. He continues, however: “hee 
that hath given us leave to kill them, for our use, hath 
not given us leave to abuse them, at our pleasure; they 
are so our drudges, that they are our fellowes by 
creation.”36 This seems to return to Aquinas’ sense that 
animals are on earth to serve humans, but here Hall is 
making an important distinction. While it is acceptable 
to kill animals for use--that is, that their role as our 
“drudges” will include them being our meat and clothing 
as well as our servants--animals are not to be the 
victims of our pleasure, that is, they are not to be 
killed for no practical reason. Animals, in Hall’s 
representation are “our fellows by creation”: they share 
our world. Even though they have a lower place than 
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humans they still have a place. This is significantly 
different from the egocentric view that presented animals 
as mere objects, whose deaths were to be regarded as 
robbery rather than homicide, and the abuse of whom was 
regarded as detrimental to human salvation, not to the 
experience of the animal.  
However, it is worth remembering that Hall was also 
cited earlier in this essay as evidence of the 
continuation of the Thomist tradition in England: “The 
mercifull man rewardeth his owne soule ...” he stated. 
What is clear from this is that these two visions of 
ethics--that of the good self, and that of the good life-
-not only existed at the same time, they actually co-
existed in the early modern period: Hall could be 
simultaneously a Thomist and something of a Montaignean. 
But it is not merely on an individual basis that this 
apparently contradictory ethical framework can be seen. 
It is also to be traced in institutions. 
 
Baiting and Justice 
 
In “Of cruelty” Montaigne writes, “We owe justice to men, 
and mercy and kindness to other creatures that may be 
capable of receiving it.”37 Here Montaigne makes a 
distinction between justice and mercy, and the 
implication is, I think, that justice is something that 
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only humans can experience as both recipients and 
benefactors. On the other hand, animals, while within the 
compass of human care, are not capable of either 
receiving or distributing justice, one of the four 
cardinal virtues. Montaigne’s assertion that justice 
cannot be directed towards animals is also evident in a 
very different context: in the English legal system. 
While in continental Europe trials of animals did take 
place, English law was different.
38
 Instead of a trial of 
the animal, in England the animal that had killed or 
caused injury was declared deodand (from the Latin deo 
dandum--given to God) and the owner either paid a fine to 
retrieve the animal or the animal was destroyed and so 
the owner lost the economic value of that animal. This 
distinction between continental European and English law 
stems from the fact that in English law an animal was 
perceived to be incapable of intent, and therefore of 
committing a crime: only a reasonable creature could 
intend something. A death resulting from the actions of 
an animal was termed a “Casuall death,” a death without 
meaning because without purpose.
39
 But on top of this 
denial to animals of a sense of intention, if the animal 
was declared deodand that placed it within a category 
that included not human criminals but objects. In a case 
of drowning from Essex in 1576, for example, a set of 
blown up bladders (early modern arm-bands) that failed to 
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keep a child afloat were declared deodand. The objects 
had not fulfilled their function and were taken from 
their owner. The punishment was not, of course, directed 
at the objects but at the owner of the objects.
40
 
This legal practice can be witnessed on two 
occasions in the Bear Garden, home to the baiting of 
bears on London’s Bankside. The killing of bears in the 
Bear Garden was unusual in this period for one very 
practical reason: bears were specially imported--brought 
over from continental Europe (there were no indigenous 
bears in England, Scotland or Wales)
41
--and were too 
expensive to kill on a regular basis.
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 It is for this 
reason that, during a baiting contest, human bear-wards 
would step in to defend the bear from the attacking dogs. 
One bear would be baited numerous times over a number of 
years. But on two occasions the value of the animal was 
set aside and the bear was killed. The reason for these 
killings shows how the apparently contradictory ethical 
frameworks available in early modern England existed not 
only in the minds of individuals but also on an 
institutional level. 
In 1609 James VI and I went to the Tower “to see a 
triall of the Lyons single valour, against a great fierce 
Beare, which had kild a child, that was negligently left 
in the Beare-house.” The entertainment is actually a kind 
of chivalric ritual that might allow the spectators to 
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see right overcome might; the law (in the shape of the 
lion, of course) overwhelm the savage bear. John Stow and 
Edmond Howe record the event: 
  
This fierce Beare was brought into the open yard, 
behind the Lyons Den, which was the place for 
fight: then was the great Lyon put forth, who gazed 
a while, but never offred to assault or approch the 
Beare: then were two mastife Dogs put in, who past 
by the Beare, and boldly seazed upon the Lyon: then 
was a stone Horse put into the same yard, who 
suddenly sented & saw both the Beare and Lyon, and 
very carelessly grazed in the middle of the yard 
between them both: and then were sixe dogs put in, 
the most whereof at the first seazed upon the Lyon, 
but they sodaily left him, and seazed uppon the 
Horse, and hadde worryed him to death, but that 
three stout Beare-wards, even as the K[ing] wished, 
came boldly in, and rescued the horse, by taking 
off the Dogges one by one, whilest the Lyon and 
Beare stared uppon them, and so went forth with 
their Dogs: then was that Lyon suffered to go into 
his den againe, which he endevoured to have done 
long before: And then were divers other Lyons put 
into that place, one after another, but they shewed 
no more sport nor valour then the first, and every 
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of them so soone as they espied the trap doores 
open, ran hastily into their dens. Then lastly, 
there were put forth together the two young lustie 
Lyons, which were bred in that yard, and were now 
grown great: these at first beganne to march 
proudly towardes the Beare, which the Beare 
perceiving, came hastily out of a corner to meete 
them, and sodainely offred to fight with the Lyon, 
but both the Lyon and Lionesse skipt up and downe, 
and fearefully fled from the Beare, and so these 
like the former Lyons, not willing to endure any 
fight, sought the next way into their denne.  
 
The animals’ failure to live up to royal expectation--the 
cowardice of the lions before the bear--means a failure 
of this “triall” before the King. Instead, James VI and I 
proposed something else, something more popular: “And the 
fift of July, according to the kings commandement, this 
Beare was bayted to death upon a stage: and unto the 
mother of the murthered child was giuen xx.p. out of part 
of that money which the people gave to see the Beare 
kild.”43 This seems quite simply to be the law of deodand 
in action: the Master of the Bears loses the value of his 
bear in its death, and compensation is paid to the mother 
for the loss of her child out of the day’s profit: “xx.p” 
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here apparently meaning twenty pence, a pitifully small 
sum. 
 Almost fifty years later virtually exactly the same 
“trial” by baiting takes place. Perfect Proceedings of 
State Affaires from September 1655 records that a child 
“between four and five years of age” was accidentally 
locked in with the bears and had his face bitten off. The 
child died. The outcome for the bear is described as 
follows: 
 
the Bear for killing the Child fell to the Lord of 
the Soil, and was by the Bearward redeemed for 
fifty shillings; and the Bearwards told the Mother 
of the Child that they could not help it, (though 
some think it to bee a design of that wicked house 
to get money) and they told the Mother that the 
bear should bee bated to death, and she should have 
half the mony, & accordingly there were bills stuck 
up and down about the City of it, and a 
considerable summe of mony gathered to see the Bear 
bated to death; some say above [6] pound, and now 
all is done, they offer the woman three pound not 
to prosecute them.
44
 
 
Once again the killer bear is declared deodand--in the 
terms of the report, it “fell to the Lord of the Soil, 
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and was by the Bearward redeemed for fifty shillings.” In 
the eyes of the law, this is the punishment, and it is a 
punishment that falls not on the bear, but on its owner 
who loses a valuable animal and who makes only about £3 
in compensation from the baiting (one should also note 
that the compensation for the death of a child has gone 
up considerably by 1655). 
 But, to say that these killings in the Bear Garden 
are evidence of the law of deodand in action is only 
partially true. What is also possible is that the killing 
of the killer animal in the Bear Garden is a punishment, 
that what is being witnessed is a kind of execution--more 
like the putting to death of a human criminal at Tyburn 
than what happens at the knacker’s yard. For this 
interpretation to be available the animal must be 
understood to deserve punishment, and as such must be 
perceived to be a member (albeit a somewhat marginal one) 
of the community, and so answerable to that community’s 
rules. In fact, the interpretation of the baiting to 
death as a punishment rests upon the possibility that the 
animal knows, or ought to know, the rules; that the 
deaths of these children are anything but “Casuall.” 
 These two events in the Bear Garden can be read, 
then, as evidence that there were two different ethical 
frameworks available to early modern English men and 
women. On the one hand there is the Thomist, 
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anthropocentric vision in which animals are not in 
themselves worthy of kind acts, and in which they have 
the status of objects--like a cart or some arm-bands. 
This vision is clearly present in the law of deodand, and 
would make sense as a way of understanding the prevalence 
of cruel sports in the period. But in the killing of the 
killer bears there can be read another view of animals. 
In this view they are perceived as capable of feeling 
pain, fear and so on (remember the lions running away in 
Stow and Howe’s description), and can be understood as 
fellow beings. On this basis, animals are baited and are 
given intent; they are other, and they are same. 
 The different perceptions of killing that are 
emerging in early modern ideas, then, are based upon 
different conceptions of animals: between that faith in 
the idea of the animal as an unreasonable object that can 
be stolen, but not murdered, baited but not punished, and 
the animal as fellow being that can feel cruelty and 
should experience compassion, that can be killed for use 
but not for pleasure. Recognizing the existence of such 
diverse ways of thinking about animals in this period is 
important and it challenges the notion of the apparently 
unproblematic violence of the early modern Bear Garden 
and questions Keith Thomas’ somewhat one-sided modern 
understanding of that period. But these differences do 
not end there. Where we have found animals objectified 
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and anthropomorphized, we can trace in this distinction 
another division, one that is still being felt, and lived 
with, today. 
 
Thinking Theoretically 
 
The division that I have characterized within ethical 
discussion is that between concentration upon the good 
self and the dedication to leading a good life, and such 
a distinction opens up very different responses to 
animals and to the world more generally. If the focus of 
the inward government theory is toward directing the 
actions of the self then, by logical extension, all 
discussions of the outer world must remain purely 
theoretical. These are not discussions of real moments--
real ethical decisions--but possible ones that might be 
faced by any individual, and are laid out in discussion 
in order for individual readers to prepare themselves for 
similar experiences. In his work, A Treatise of Anger 
(1609), for example, John Downame writes:  
 
Though therefore anger be a perturbation of the 
mind it doth not follow that it is evill, for not 
the perturbation it selfe but the cause thereof 
maketh it good if it be good, and evill if it be 
evill. Furthermore whereas they obiect that anger 
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blindeth and confoundeth reason, I answere first, 
that if anger bee temperate and moderate, it doth 
serviceably waite upon reason, and not imperiously 
over rule it: and rather maketh a man more constant 
and resolute in walking the path of truth.
45
 
 
All this is purely theoretical--it is establishing the 
place of anger within the inward government theory. And 
when something close to a real situation emerges, Downame 
remains within this framework: “Many,” he writes in the 
chapter entitled “the properties of uniust anger,” “are 
not onely incensed against the persons of their enemies 
who are men like unto themselves, but also with brute 
beasts, which are not capable thereof.” The possibility 
of anger towards animals Downame regards as a futile loss 
of control on the part of the angry self--it is likened 
to “children, who having gotten a fall beate the earth.”46 
Anger is not to be directed towards the unreasonable, and 
animals, like earth, lack reason and, by implication, all 
else that might link them with humans. Animals are not 
worthy of inclusion as patients, especially where the 
focus is the agent.  
Montainge’s ethics are very different. In his essay 
on the same subject as Downame’s later treatise, for 
example, Montaigne begins with theory--Plutarch and 
Aristotle--and moves swiftly to practice: the brutality 
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directed towards children that he has witnessed “as I 
passed along our streets.”47 This is no mere theoretical 
discussion (although it has elements of that) it is an 
argument about the use and abuse of a real and powerful 
passion, and the effects of that passion on the lives of 
moral patients. As such, Montaigne’s self--and the Essais 
are an exploration of himself--is a real self, not an 
abstract one; he is living in the world rather than only 
in the realm of theory, and faces the problems that the 
world throws up as real, not theoretical ones. This is 
how he can see that cruelty is being directed towards 
animals, and that that cruelty needs to be assessed 
within the logic of the day-to-day existences we share 
with animals. But we can once again go further than this. 
There is also a difference, I would argue, between 
Downame’s animal and Montaigne’s animal, a difference 
that is characteristic of the wider difference between 
ethical focus on the good self and on the good life. 
Downame’s animal is a theoretical one--there is no 
particular animal, no specific situation. Montaigne, on 
the other hand, thinks about the stag that “surrenders to 
ourselves who are pursuing him, asking for mercy by his 
tears,” about “the scream of a hare in the teeth of my 
dogs.”48 Here there is a sense that the animals he 
represents are real ones, that the situations have 
actually been experienced. Most famously, Montaigne 
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refers to his cat in “Apology for Raymond Sebond.” He 
asks, “When I play with my cat, who knows if I am not a 
pastime to her more than she is to me?”49 This is a 
philosophical question that emerges from what seems to be 
a real experience. Montaigne has looked at his cat and is 
asking about that cat, not a theoretical one. 
There is a difference, then, between Downame and 
Montaigne (and from them, a difference between the study 
of the good self and the study of the good life) that is 
a difference between the concept of `the animal’ and of 
`that animal’: that is, between a theoretical situation 
in which `man and beast’ confront each other, and a real 
one in which Montaigne and a stag, or a cat, come face to 
face. When Montaigne thinks about stag hunting it is not 
as a theoretician, but as a practitioner, and as a 
practitioner-—paradoxically--he knows that a stag feels 
its death; he has seen its tears. 
In a recent essay, Jacques Derrida has highlighted 
the significance and implications of the difference 
between what I am terming `the animal’ and `that animal’; 
between the abstract and the concrete perceptions and 
representations of nonhuman beings that are available to 
us in different kinds of ethical thought. For Derrida 
once again it is animals’ capacity to suffer that is key, 
and, again, reason--here characterized by Derrida as the 
logos--is undermined as the determining attribute. 
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Derrida represents this shift as moving from Descartes’ 
“indubitable certainty”--cogito ergo sum, I think 
therefore I am--to Jeremy Bentham’s statement “The 
question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But 
can they suffer?”50 Derrida writes, “No one can deny the 
suffering, fear or panic, the terror or fright that 
humans witness in certain animals.”51 The shift is from a 
metaphysical concept of animals--as machines in 
Descartes’ thought--to an empirical account. 
While I agree wholeheartedly with Derrida’s 
distinction I would want to argue that that distinction 
was already in place by the time Descartes’ wrote his 
Meditations (it may also have urged Descartes to propose 
the “beast-machine” hypothesis).52 But, whatever my 
disagreement with Derrida over the source of this 
philosophical shift, he does contextualize it in a way 
that reinforces the significance of the modes by which 
philosophy has characterized human relationships with 
animals, and from that, the ease with which animals can 
be killed. Derrida proposes that “this word animal that 
men have given themselves at the origin of humanity” 
allows for a relationship with the world that would be 
impossible if the foundation was not `the animal’ (the 
general singular) but `that animal’ (the particular 
singular). He argues that human “Interpretive decisions 
(in all their metaphysical, ethical, juridical, and 
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political consequences) ... depend on what is presupposed 
by the general singular of this word Animal.”53 It is the 
way we have theorized real animals out of our conceptual 
frameworks--how we deal with animals as a general 
grouping rather than as individuals--that has allowed for 
interpretation in the first place. Without this concept--
the animal--understanding as it exists now would cease.  
If we take the possession of reason as the central 
organizing principle of Western philosophy (and it is 
hard not to see this as so) then it is possible to see 
that Derrida is correct. Humankind has traced the 
foundation of all knowing to the presence of that 
invisible essence, known in Aristotelian philosophy as 
the “inorganic soul.”54 What this has entailed is a 
certain positioning of animals, not as animals (as in 
real animals) but as ideas first and real second. It is 
this disjunction in the way in which humans think with 
and about animals that allows, I think, for the 
simultaneous existence of bear baiting and the emergent 
ethics of fellow-feeling with animals in the early modern 
period, and as such might help to explain the killing of 
the killer animals in the Bear Garden. While the law does 
not allow for such an event to be understood as 
punishment it is possible that the spectators, caught as 
they were between two very distinct ethical positions, 
were able simultaneously to enjoy the spectacle of animal 
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death and to comprehend it as some kind of justice. They 
could, in fact, see the animals both as mere objects and 
as members of the community. 
But to focus attention on historical interpretation 
alone is, perhaps, to imply that things are simply better 
now, that history has been a slow process of improvement, 
that we now--in ethical terms--strive for good lives 
rather than for good selves, and that the position of 
animals has been changed forever. Such, of course, is not 
the case: Derrida’s essay is not historical, it is 
polemical. The disjunction between the desire for the 
good self and the good life continues and it is this 
disjunction that allows for the co-existence of pet-
ownership and meat eating, of anthropomorphism and 
experimentation.
55
  
We maintain in some areas of our lives, that we--the 
good selves--remain central and all other beings 
marginal. In other parts of our lives, however, something 
very different occurs. We turn from ourselves to look at 
the world around us, we take on the possibility of 
suffering in beings other than ourselves and as such find 
some killing unnecessary, distasteful. We turn, in fact, 
from ‘the animal’ to ‘that animal’. As such it is worth 
returning to think again about the quotation at the 
beginning of this essay. Perhaps Keith Thomas’ assertion 
that there was no concept of cruelty to animals in early 
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modern England not only blanks-out the contradictions of 
that period. Maybe it also helps us to blank-out the fact 
that we still live with these contradictions. There is, 
after all, nothing more reassuring than thinking that we 
are better humans than those men and women of the past. 
Nothing is more comforting than a history that allows us 
to maintain the status quo.  
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